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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : POL - F. C. Allen

DATE: March 13, 1959

FROM : POL - William R. Tyler *WR*

SUBJECT: Your Memorandum of March 11 on Negotiations on Germany.

I found your memorandum very interesting, and once again I have reexamined my own thoughts on the subject you discussed. Essentially, I think that if, in the course of negotiations with the Russians, there was serious evidence that they are interested in reaching a broad settlement in Europe, including German reunification in freedom as the outcome of a European Security agreement, they there might be considerable merit in making your suggestion.

For reasons I wrote to Coburn Kidd recently, I dislike the idea of making an offer to the Soviet Union ahead of time, involving the withdrawal of our troops, as a tactical gambit, in the hope that the Soviets will be either so naive as to reject the offer out of hand, or find themselves under such compulsion that they cannot avoid giving us a psychological victory.

Thus, I think your basic idea (that as part of an agreement on German reunification) we should consider offering withdrawal of our troops from a reunited Germany against a similar pledge by the USSR, is not only acceptable but indeed natural.

To repeat: it is a matter of timing, and of not offering concessions ahead of time in the hope of being somehow able to get something cheap by doing so.

With regard to the German domestic question, I just don't know whether your view of the probable course of German opinion is well-founded, but I am certainly prepared to accept many of the estimates and danger signals which you describe. I wonder, however, whether making the offer you have in mind now would, in fact, have as far reaching an effect on German attitudes as you imply.

There are several points in your numbered paragraph 3 which bear discussion, but I am afraid we will have to put that off for awhile.

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : POL: William R. Tyler *WRT*

DATE: March 11, 1959

FROM : POL: F. O. Allen *FOA*

SUBJECT: Forthcoming Negotiations on Germany with the USSR: Possible Advantages of Proposing Withdrawal of Soviet and Western Forces from German Soil as Part of an Agreement on Reunification.

As things are now shaping up it looks as though we are in for a period of negotiations with the USSR which it is to our interest to prolong as long as possible. The negotiations will probably be followed (if we succeed in avoiding war) by a Berlin settlement, which by enhancing the status of the GDR, and by de-Germanizing Berlin or otherwise altering its quality as symbol of eventual reunification - will appear an ominous defeat to those Germans who feel strongly on the subject of restoring German unity. I suggest that in this situation there are a number of reasons why we should give serious consideration to proposing, in the forthcoming negotiations with the USSR, that as part of an agreement on German reunification and of a peace settlement between Germany and the Four Powers, both Western and Soviet troops should be withdrawn from German soil.

(1) As the Ambassador has pointed out, it would be to our advantage to have the forthcoming negotiations go on for months, or even years - in the hope of delaying indefinitely the danger of a military clash over access to Berlin. It seems probable that a proposal for mutual troop withdrawals would lead to most complicated negotiations, which might in fact last for years. I know of no other theme about which the Four Powers could negotiate for more than a few weeks. Certainly if we merely present in different guise our 1955 General proposals, the negotiations will come to a speedy end.

(2) If we maintain our traditional position as the French wish, and as Adenauer now wishes (fearing that any other course will lead to dissolution of NATO and total withdrawal of U.S. forces from Europe) it seems on balance probable that we will be in for serious trouble a few years from now in Germany. The reasons this seems probable are the following:

(a) For years there has been a tendency not only in the opposition parties but also among elements in the CDU who do not subordinate themselves to the Chancellor (as well as in the Foreign Office) to move in the direction of seeking compromises with the Soviet position on Germany, in the hope of somehow bringing about German unity. It is widely believed that reunification, although it may be impossible anyway due to Soviet policy will certainly never come about as long as the western and West German position is that united Germany must be free to continue to have western, particularly U.S., troops stationed on its soil. It is held that there can in fact be no freedom of any kind in the Soviet Zone, with or without free elections, as long as Soviet forces remain in the Zone, and that Soviet forces will inevitably and understandably remain in the Zone as long as western forces, particularly U.S.

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forces, remain in West Germany. It follows that there will be no freedom in the Zone, as well as no reunification as long as western forces are stationed on German soil.

(b) The political elements who stress these points (including a number of leading figures in the CDU who are certain to be more influential in the post-Adenauer period than they are now) do not conclude that reunification would be possible if western forces withdraw from Germany. They conclude rather that reunification is certain to be impossible as long as it seems probable to the Russians that western forces would be stationed in reunited Germany; - and that there is at least some small chance that reunification might eventually be possible if the West were willing to negotiate with the Russians a mutual and permanent withdrawal (with elaborate safeguards) of both western and Soviet forces from German soil.

(c) We are certain to be in for future trouble if as Adenauer now wishes we maintain our present position (that we cannot in return for reunification negotiate an agreement that United Germany should have no foreign troops on its soil) and if meanwhile the Soviets proceed to sign a separate peace treaty with the GDR, and we accept some de facto settlement on Berlin involving increased status for the GDR. It is highly probable if these things occur that eventually many of those in West Germany who are or later become seriously concerned about reunification will hold it against us that the possibility of a settlement through mutual withdrawal of Western and Soviet forces was never even explored in the period before Germany's division was formalized and finalized by the signing of the Soviet-GDR peace treaty.

(d) The danger is that what now is rather a minor point, - whether or not we should make a tactical gambit in the field of mutual troop withdrawal as part of a reunification settlement (and this is now a minor point because it is certain the Russians would not accept it, though they might pretend to for months) - may in future, in the post-Adenauer period become a major factor embittering relations between the Federal Republic and the West. The danger is that in future there will in all likelihood come to power in CDU and government political elements who while in no sense anti-western, will nonetheless put considerably less stress on good relations with France and the creation of a small "Europe" centering around France than does Chancellor Adenauer, - and considerably more stress on German unity. There may well develop eventually a widespread tendency to refer to Adenauer as the "Chancellor of the Allies", the leader who, when reunification was still possible, went unnecessarily far in the direction of placating the French and in insisting that western garrisons remain on German soil to protect the security of the Federal Republic and of France, thereby making reunification impossible. Such a development is not inevitable, - but it does seem likely. The Germans now, faced with the danger of war and Russian expansionism, are counseling us to avoid war over Berlin, and they are terrified at the thought we might consider disengagement or withdrawing our troops from Europe. Later when the crisis is over, and we have yielded something on Berlin and the Russians have signed a separate peace treaty with the GDR, we will be blamed for these developments. It will be maintained that "our man" Chancellor Adenauer, and we ourselves - both distrusted the

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Germans so much that we were unwilling to seek reunification by offering to withdraw our forces (if the Russians did the same).

(3) I would also make the following points:

(a) The Chancellor's strong opposition to any offer of troop withdrawals is largely based on his doubts about American steadfastness - his belief that if he even lets us contemplate any withdrawal, we will sooner or later withdraw will-nilly from Europe. This difficulty could be easily overcome if Mr. Dulles or Acheson simply explained to the Chancellor what we were doing and why we were doing it - and assured him that in the unlikely event of the Russians accepting, we would not abandon Europe, but simply relocate in France, Benelux, England, Italy, Spain, N.Africa.

(b) The French are far too dependent on us for their own protection, and on the Germans economically, to seriously resist this proposal once we had sold it to the Chancellor. The British would welcome it.

(c) As regards American opinion, there is plenty of evidence that the Senate would welcome such an idea - if it were recommended to them by the Secretary or the President. And I find it hard to believe that the general public would not welcome such a proposal as a fresh initiative. There also seems no need to doubt that (should the Russians accept), the public would continue to support the maintenance of U.S. forces in Europe (even if not stationed in Germany), if it were explained by the President that this is necessary since the agreement with the Russians is not self-enforcing, but can only be enforced by the continued presence of strong American forces in Europe. (Our continued presence in Europe would also reassure the French and others who might fear aggression from Germany.)

(d) The withdrawal of forces offer should be tied in with the German military build-up - to reassure the Germans the French and other NATO members who would fear Soviet attack. Thus our and the British and French divisions would only be withdrawn pari passu with the build-up of the German armed forces. The proposal would thus envisage that the withdrawal of U.S. and other foreign forces from West Germany would be gradual, corresponding with progress in the German build-up; and the last U.S. division would only pull back west of the Rhine after the Germans had attained their goal of 12 fully equipped well organized divisions.

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